Mois : juillet 2009

  • Well fancy that…

    By Nick Brooks

    Those of you who follow the news from north-west Africa will have heard about the alleged al-Qa’ida attack in northern Mauritania, in which twelve Mauritanian soldiers died. The attack occurred just east of Zouerate, close to the border with Western Sahara.

    Alle, on the always excellent Western Sahara Info blog, has a more meaty analysis of this incident than you’re likely to find on the mainstream news sources (as usual, AFP are confusing the Moroccan and Western Saharan borders). Alle makes the following observation about how these sort of things might be prevented and security in this rather large and desolate border region improved:

    “What could help a lot is a formal framework for Algeria-Mauritania-Polisario-Mali policing, since these parties are already on friendly terms with each other, while Morocco is somewhat disconnected from the whole thing (by the berm). But, for political reasons, that wouldn’t sit at all well with Rabat…”

    Certainly more security cooperation between the these four governments would help to reduce the risk of such attacks. Polisario is currently the only game in town when it comes to policing the Mauritania-Western Sahara border, at least in the direction from the former to the latter (they also manage the border crossing from Algeria into the Free Zone of Western Sahara), and their role would be crucial.

    Alle is spot on when he points out that Morocco would become jittery if these governments, with whom relations range from difficult to hostile, started cooperating on security issues along what Morocco insists is its own border (despite its lack of presence in most of the areas concerned). Any such cooperation would also rub up against thesection of the Berm that extends into Mauritania. We can be fairly sure that, despite its initiative to stop the “empty spaces” of the Sahara becoming a haven for the likes of al-Qa’ida, the US isn’t likely to be promoting a major role for Polisario in Maghrebian regional security. This would send the government in Rabat into fits of apoplexy, and Washington has been an increasingly enthusiastic supporter of Morocco’s occupation, at least under the latest Bush administration.

    So, what do we have here? Apparently, a situation in which the potential for security cooperation to combat terrorism exists, but is unlikely to be realised, at least in part because Morocco wouldn’t stand for it and Morocco’s friends would therefore not support such an initiative (Morocco and its supporters would presumably do everything they could to prevent such cooperation).

    Morocco often claims that its presence in Western Sahara is necessary to prevent terrorism, whereas in reality its occupation simply makes preventing terrorism more difficult by making regional security cooperation less likely. Let’s remember that one of the main reasons the Western Sahara-Mauritania border remains open is that Morocco’s slicing in half of Western Sahara means that it is impossible to travel from the Northern Sector to the Southern Sector of the Free Zone without transiting through Mauritania, in order to avoid the section of the Berm that extends into the far north-west of Mauritania. The Mauritanian government can’t police its borders unilaterally without making life difficult for the Sahrawi and the Polisario or increasing regional tension, which it has no desire to do (neither does it have much in the way of resources with which to do so). The Polisario polices the Free Zone pretty effectively (try getting in without their permission and chances are you’ll soon come up against a patrol), but is denied a greater role in regional security because this would upset Rabat.

    Once again, we see that Morocco’s belligerence in Western Sahara only serves to exacerabate regional insecurity and destabilise the Maghreb.

  • Well fancy that…

    By Nick Brooks

    Those of you who follow the news from north-west Africa will have heard about the alleged al-Qa’ida attack in northern Mauritania, in which twelve Mauritanian soldiers died. The attack occurred just east of Zouerate, close to the border with Western Sahara.

    Alle, on the always excellent Western Sahara Info blog, has a more meaty analysis of this incident than you’re likely to find on the mainstream news sources (as usual, AFP are confusing the Moroccan and Western Saharan borders). Alle makes the following observation about how these sort of things might be prevented and security in this rather large and desolate border region improved:

    “What could help a lot is a formal framework for Algeria-Mauritania-Polisario-Mali policing, since these parties are already on friendly terms with each other, while Morocco is somewhat disconnected from the whole thing (by the berm). But, for political reasons, that wouldn’t sit at all well with Rabat…”

    Certainly more security cooperation between the these four governments would help to reduce the risk of such attacks. Polisario is currently the only game in town when it comes to policing the Mauritania-Western Sahara border, at least in the direction from the former to the latter (they also manage the border crossing from Algeria into the Free Zone of Western Sahara), and their role would be crucial.

    Alle is spot on when he points out that Morocco would become jittery if these governments, with whom relations range from difficult to hostile, started cooperating on security issues along what Morocco insists is its own border (despite its lack of presence in most of the areas concerned). Any such cooperation would also rub up against thesection of the Berm that extends into Mauritania. We can be fairly sure that, despite its initiative to stop the “empty spaces” of the Sahara becoming a haven for the likes of al-Qa’ida, the US isn’t likely to be promoting a major role for Polisario in Maghrebian regional security. This would send the government in Rabat into fits of apoplexy, and Washington has been an increasingly enthusiastic supporter of Morocco’s occupation, at least under the latest Bush administration.

    So, what do we have here? Apparently, a situation in which the potential for security cooperation to combat terrorism exists, but is unlikely to be realised, at least in part because Morocco wouldn’t stand for it and Morocco’s friends would therefore not support such an initiative (Morocco and its supporters would presumably do everything they could to prevent such cooperation).

    Morocco often claims that its presence in Western Sahara is necessary to prevent terrorism, whereas in reality its occupation simply makes preventing terrorism more difficult by making regional security cooperation less likely. Let’s remember that one of the main reasons the Western Sahara-Mauritania border remains open is that Morocco’s slicing in half of Western Sahara means that it is impossible to travel from the Northern Sector to the Southern Sector of the Free Zone without transiting through Mauritania, in order to avoid the section of the Berm that extends into the far north-west of Mauritania. The Mauritanian government can’t police its borders unilaterally without making life difficult for the Sahrawi and the Polisario or increasing regional tension, which it has no desire to do (neither does it have much in the way of resources with which to do so). The Polisario polices the Free Zone pretty effectively (try getting in without their permission and chances are you’ll soon come up against a patrol), but is denied a greater role in regional security because this would upset Rabat.

    Once again, we see that Morocco’s belligerence in Western Sahara only serves to exacerabate regional insecurity and destabilise the Maghreb.

  • Why Morocco is Proposing Autonomy Now


    By Chasli
    Just a few observations about why I am so skeptical about Morocco’s autonomy plan and what I see as Morocco’s reasons for going down the autonomy road.

    Anyone who thinks that Morocco would ever allow the Sahrawi to control any of the territory’s mineral or fishing wealth is seriously suffering from “head-in-the-sand” syndrome. It just won’t happen. The Moroccan military, elite, and monarchy have been happily stealing Western Sahara’s abundant resources for over thirty years and are not about to relinquish their cash cow.

    Why is Morocco proposing autonomy now after showing little or no interest in it for over 30 years?

    I suspect that US pressure has something to do with it. The US was reportedly disgusted that Morocco refused to embrace Baker II. At the same time, US geopolitical and economic interests have led to increasingly close ties between the two countries (i.e. the US-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, the Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI), and the naming of Morocco as a major non-NATO ally). Much of the success of these initiatives depends on economic cooperation and regional integration in the Maghreb, and clearly the greatest obstacle to this is the unresolved Western Sahara situation. The US just wants the conflict resolved. And to Morocco’s thinking, now with the Maghreb so prominent in US plans is probably as good a time as any to make a big push for a “third way” not including independence.

    In addition, the West’s current obsession with the war on terrorism provides a smokescreen behind which Morocco feels it can slip one by the international community. By trying to appear the good guy with a seemingly generous plan for broad autonomy and by softening up world public opinion with an unprecedentedly aggressive and mendacious propaganda campaign (which brands the Polisario as a terrorist organization), Morocco is trying to exploit the window of opportunity provided by the war on terrorism. As long as terrorism is on the front page, Morocco feels it just might gain validation of its land grab through the back door, with the ruse of autonomy.

    Finally, and probably most importantly, is oil. A discovery of oil off the Western Sahara would pose a huge dilemma. Economically, Morocco is suffering mightily from $60 plus oil and would want to exploit any finds as quickly as possible. Morocco obviously cannot exploit the oil by itself, but it is open to question whether international oil companies would be willing to drill for oil in a non-self-governing territory under illegal occupation. The big push for autonomy fits in neatly with the current Moroccan imperative to resolve the Western Sahara crisis but while retaining sovereign control of the land. And again, anyone who thinks that an autonomous Western Sahara would realize any economic benefits from oil off its territory has probably been smoking too much of the hashish that the Moroccan government and military habitually smuggle into Europe.

    In conclusion, I just can’t find any reasons to think that there is anything sincere or serious about Morocco’s autonomy plan. They are floating it not because they want to, but either because they feel they have to or because they feel they just might get away with it.

  • Why Morocco is Proposing Autonomy Now


    By Chasli
    Just a few observations about why I am so skeptical about Morocco’s autonomy plan and what I see as Morocco’s reasons for going down the autonomy road.

    Anyone who thinks that Morocco would ever allow the Sahrawi to control any of the territory’s mineral or fishing wealth is seriously suffering from “head-in-the-sand” syndrome. It just won’t happen. The Moroccan military, elite, and monarchy have been happily stealing Western Sahara’s abundant resources for over thirty years and are not about to relinquish their cash cow.

    Why is Morocco proposing autonomy now after showing little or no interest in it for over 30 years?

    I suspect that US pressure has something to do with it. The US was reportedly disgusted that Morocco refused to embrace Baker II. At the same time, US geopolitical and economic interests have led to increasingly close ties between the two countries (i.e. the US-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, the Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI), and the naming of Morocco as a major non-NATO ally). Much of the success of these initiatives depends on economic cooperation and regional integration in the Maghreb, and clearly the greatest obstacle to this is the unresolved Western Sahara situation. The US just wants the conflict resolved. And to Morocco’s thinking, now with the Maghreb so prominent in US plans is probably as good a time as any to make a big push for a “third way” not including independence.

    In addition, the West’s current obsession with the war on terrorism provides a smokescreen behind which Morocco feels it can slip one by the international community. By trying to appear the good guy with a seemingly generous plan for broad autonomy and by softening up world public opinion with an unprecedentedly aggressive and mendacious propaganda campaign (which brands the Polisario as a terrorist organization), Morocco is trying to exploit the window of opportunity provided by the war on terrorism. As long as terrorism is on the front page, Morocco feels it just might gain validation of its land grab through the back door, with the ruse of autonomy.

    Finally, and probably most importantly, is oil. A discovery of oil off the Western Sahara would pose a huge dilemma. Economically, Morocco is suffering mightily from $60 plus oil and would want to exploit any finds as quickly as possible. Morocco obviously cannot exploit the oil by itself, but it is open to question whether international oil companies would be willing to drill for oil in a non-self-governing territory under illegal occupation. The big push for autonomy fits in neatly with the current Moroccan imperative to resolve the Western Sahara crisis but while retaining sovereign control of the land. And again, anyone who thinks that an autonomous Western Sahara would realize any economic benefits from oil off its territory has probably been smoking too much of the hashish that the Moroccan government and military habitually smuggle into Europe.

    In conclusion, I just can’t find any reasons to think that there is anything sincere or serious about Morocco’s autonomy plan. They are floating it not because they want to, but either because they feel they have to or because they feel they just might get away with it.

  • Comment on the post of Chasli titled « Why Was Morocco’s Autonomy Initiative Devised?

    By Nick Brooks

    I agree with your assessment of the autonomy plan. I would argue that it is essentially a propaganda exercise designed to give the impression that Morocco is a progressive nation seeking and end to a long-running conflict, up against an intractable foe (i.e. the Polisario). I don’t believe that the plan has any practical utility (beyond its propaganda function), as its implementation would require that the issues of the effective partition of Western Sahara and the fate of the exiled refugees are addressed.

    It appears that Morocco has no intention of addressing the partition or refugee issues. The fact of partition is downplayed or even denied, with Morocco claiming that the Polisario-controlled areas do not exist. The propaganda line is that these areas constitute a « buffer zone » set up be Morocco for security purposes. Abdelhamid El Ouali, the author of the recently published pro-autonomy block « Saharan Conflict » told me at the launch of his book that the idea that Polisario had control of these areas was false, and that Polisario had « never liberated » any territory. He was somewhat taken aback when I told him that I worked in these areas with the Polisario in the course of my scientific research, and didn’t really have any response.

    As for the refugees in the camps around Tindouf, we hear variously that they are Moroccans held against their will or that there are not very many of them. El Ouali claims in his book that there are a few Sahrawi there held against their will, but that a large proportion of the population of the camps consists of people fleeing drought in the Sahel in the 1990s.

    The autonomy plan cannot provide a solution to the conflict unless it addresses the status of the Polisario-controlled zone and the refugees in Algeria. It does not. Even if Morocco were to gain approval for the plan and somehow « normalise » its occupation, it would be left with a rump Sahrawi state in the Polisario areas, and an even more irate refugee population. Polisario is unlikely to give up the fight and hand its « Free Zone » over to Morocco, and the refugees are unlikely to go an live under Moroccan occupation (even if Morocco invited them, and one suspects that the last thing Morocco wants is a large population of pro-independence Sahrawi living in occupied Western Sahara and causing trouble for it). So the only outcomes are either a continuation of the status quo, or an expansion of Moroccan control over all of Western Sahara through military force.

    So, the autonomy plan either changes nothing on the ground, or is a prelude to war. It is possible that Morocco is seeking to legitimize its « ownership » of Western Sahara in the eyes of the international community so that it can complete its conquest of Western Sahara and claim it is just dealing with an uprising by « separatists » in territory that everyone recognizes as Moroccan. However, this would risk conflict with Algeria and regional destabilization. But we shouldn’t dismiss the possibility that the autonomy plan is a precursor to further aggressive military activity on the part of Rabat.

  • Comment on the post of Chasli titled « Why Was Morocco’s Autonomy Initiative Devised?

    By Nick Brooks

    I agree with your assessment of the autonomy plan. I would argue that it is essentially a propaganda exercise designed to give the impression that Morocco is a progressive nation seeking and end to a long-running conflict, up against an intractable foe (i.e. the Polisario). I don’t believe that the plan has any practical utility (beyond its propaganda function), as its implementation would require that the issues of the effective partition of Western Sahara and the fate of the exiled refugees are addressed.

    It appears that Morocco has no intention of addressing the partition or refugee issues. The fact of partition is downplayed or even denied, with Morocco claiming that the Polisario-controlled areas do not exist. The propaganda line is that these areas constitute a « buffer zone » set up be Morocco for security purposes. Abdelhamid El Ouali, the author of the recently published pro-autonomy block « Saharan Conflict » told me at the launch of his book that the idea that Polisario had control of these areas was false, and that Polisario had « never liberated » any territory. He was somewhat taken aback when I told him that I worked in these areas with the Polisario in the course of my scientific research, and didn’t really have any response.

    As for the refugees in the camps around Tindouf, we hear variously that they are Moroccans held against their will or that there are not very many of them. El Ouali claims in his book that there are a few Sahrawi there held against their will, but that a large proportion of the population of the camps consists of people fleeing drought in the Sahel in the 1990s.

    The autonomy plan cannot provide a solution to the conflict unless it addresses the status of the Polisario-controlled zone and the refugees in Algeria. It does not. Even if Morocco were to gain approval for the plan and somehow « normalise » its occupation, it would be left with a rump Sahrawi state in the Polisario areas, and an even more irate refugee population. Polisario is unlikely to give up the fight and hand its « Free Zone » over to Morocco, and the refugees are unlikely to go an live under Moroccan occupation (even if Morocco invited them, and one suspects that the last thing Morocco wants is a large population of pro-independence Sahrawi living in occupied Western Sahara and causing trouble for it). So the only outcomes are either a continuation of the status quo, or an expansion of Moroccan control over all of Western Sahara through military force.

    So, the autonomy plan either changes nothing on the ground, or is a prelude to war. It is possible that Morocco is seeking to legitimize its « ownership » of Western Sahara in the eyes of the international community so that it can complete its conquest of Western Sahara and claim it is just dealing with an uprising by « separatists » in territory that everyone recognizes as Moroccan. However, this would risk conflict with Algeria and regional destabilization. But we shouldn’t dismiss the possibility that the autonomy plan is a precursor to further aggressive military activity on the part of Rabat.

  • Why Was Morocco’s Autonomy Initiative Devised?


    By Chasli



    This view that Morocco’s autonomy initiative for the Western Sahara should be supported because it is a commendable and reasonable compromise to once and for all overcome “the deadlock in United Nations’ mediated negotiations” has been getting a lot of play time recently by the pro-Rabat forces. The view is unacceptable and should be soundly rejected because its basic premise — that the “deadlock is the result of a “fail[ure] to reach a mutually-acceptable solution — is just not true. The reality of the matter is that the current deadlock is based totally on the failure of Morocco to abide by the “mutually-acceptable solution” that was reached by Rabat and the Polisario in 1988, approved in its final form by the Security Council (S/22464, “Settlement Plan”) in 1991, and refined further by the Houston Accords signed by both parties in 1997. The autonomy initiative is a joke because it ignores the reality that it is Morocco that has created the current deadlock by refusing to implement the far-reaching solution that was agreed to by all the parties to the conflict (Morocco, Polisario, Algeria, and the UN) two decades ago.

    With the 20th Anniversary of that historic agreement coming up in August it is I think an appropriate time to look back at the Settlement Plan. I will quote liberally from the International Crisis Group’s (ICG) June 2007 report, Western Sahara: Out of the Impasse, which gives a concise, accurate, and well-written analysis of the referendum years (all quotes below are from that report with page numbers noted).

    In August 1988, both Polisario and Morocco declared that they accepted a UN proposal (based on an earlier OAU proposal) for a ceasefire, exchange of prisoners, repatriation of refugees and the withdrawal of Moroccan forces from the territory, to be followed by a referendum on self-determination, with the choice being between independence and integration into Morocco. A final version of this proposal, known as the Settlement Plan, was approved by the Security Council in 1991. (p.1-2)

    I was following the issue at the UN in Geneva in the early 1990’s and remember the euphoria accompanying the Settlement Plan. The Polisario and Hassan II had met for the first time; a mutually-acceptable plan to resolve the crisis had become a reality; MINURSO was in place to register voters; and the referendum was expected within a year. The euphoria, however, proved to be short lived. With the ink on the Settlement Plan still wet, Morocco embarked on a pattern of obstruction that would eventually result in the scuttling of the Plan a decade later. The ICG continues:

    Morocco and the Polisario Front had formally agreed in 1988 that the referendum should be based on the electorate as defined by the 1974 census of the territory….But in April 1991 King Hassan of Morocco insisted that the voter rolls be expanded well beyond what has previously been agreed and include people who had long been settled in Morocco. (p. 2)

    Had King Hassan allowed MINURSO to do its work per the Settlement Agreement, the referendum would have taken place in 1992 or 1993 and the crisis would have been over. Instead he chose to pursue a strategy of trying to pad the electoral roles with pro-Rabat Moroccans “in order to maximize Morocco’s chances of winning the referendum.” (p. 2) The Polisario of course resisted this attempt to rewrite and circumvent the agreement, and by mid-decade the referendum process had made little progress. Then along came James Baker III to try to save the day.

    When the process seemed in danger of coming to a stop, the personal envoy of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the former U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker III, managed to rescue it through intensive diplomacy. In a series of meetings which he held with Morocco, Polisario and Algeria in April 1997, all three parties reaffirmed their commitment to the 1991 Settlement Plan. Further rounds in London and Lisbon paved the way for a final meeting in Houston on 14-16 September 1997. There, agreement was reached by the parties on all the issues blocking implementation of the Settlement Plan, including the key issue of voter identification. (p. 2)

    With a new agreement in hand, MINURSO was able to resume the registration of voters. “In January 2000, MINURSO, after years of meticulous work, at last arrived at what it regarded as a fair determination of the valid electorate for the proposed referendum, namely a total electorate of 86,386.” (p. 2) At that point, once again the end of the crisis was in sight and the referendum could have been held in short order. But Rabat had other ideas. MINURSO was “promptly faced with no fewer than 131,038 appeals against its decisions…, the vast majority of these Moroccan-sponsored applicants.” (p. 2) The Settlement Plan was dead.

    Reluctant to dismiss these appeals and accordingly faced with the prospect of, in effect, having to begin the voter identification process all over again, the UN tacitly dropped the 1991 Settlement Plan…. (p. 2)

    Again, my reason for returning to this history of the Settlement Plan is to counter the view of the pro-Rabat people that autonomy is a fine compromise justified by the elusiveness of a “mutually-acceptable solution.” As you should see from the above, the parties mutually accepted two major solutions in 1988 and 1997, and Morocco obstructed, undermined, and ultimately trashed both. Again, the ICG is eloquent on this:

    There is a clear asymmetry in the behaviour of the main parties. The Polisario Front signed up to the 1991 Settlement Plan and, having made a number of concessions on the voter identification issue and on certain secondary matters, was clearly prepared to abide by its outcome…. It cannot be said of Polisario that it went back on any of its undertakings. But Morocco repeatedly did so with impunity. Whenever matters came to a head, Morocco demonstrated that it did not accept UN arbitration ofimportant issues if this arbitration went – or threatened to go – against it. AndMorocco also, and above all, repeatedly demonstrated that it accepted the principle of self-determination only if the result of its exercise in a referendum could be guaranteed in advance to be in Morocco’s favour. (p. 5)

    Why was the autonomy initiative devised? Tanya Warburg’s view that it has to do withMorocco’s desire to find a “mutually-acceptable solution” to break the deadlock is pure nonsense. Once again, such a solution was reached years ago and Morocco showed itself to be a thoroughly dishonest and duplicitous negotiating partner. The autonomy initiative is nothing more than a cynical attempt by Morocco to leverage its friendship with the U.S. and France to prevent self-determination in the ex-colony and to gain formal recognition of its illegal annexation. I say “cynical” because history has proven that Morocco and its apologists such as Tanya Warburg couldn’t care less about the well-being of the Western Saharans. If they did they wouldn’t be so insistent on denying them the right to vote on their future.

  • Why Was Morocco’s Autonomy Initiative Devised?


    By Chasli



    This view that Morocco’s autonomy initiative for the Western Sahara should be supported because it is a commendable and reasonable compromise to once and for all overcome “the deadlock in United Nations’ mediated negotiations” has been getting a lot of play time recently by the pro-Rabat forces. The view is unacceptable and should be soundly rejected because its basic premise — that the “deadlock is the result of a “fail[ure] to reach a mutually-acceptable solution — is just not true. The reality of the matter is that the current deadlock is based totally on the failure of Morocco to abide by the “mutually-acceptable solution” that was reached by Rabat and the Polisario in 1988, approved in its final form by the Security Council (S/22464, “Settlement Plan”) in 1991, and refined further by the Houston Accords signed by both parties in 1997. The autonomy initiative is a joke because it ignores the reality that it is Morocco that has created the current deadlock by refusing to implement the far-reaching solution that was agreed to by all the parties to the conflict (Morocco, Polisario, Algeria, and the UN) two decades ago.

    With the 20th Anniversary of that historic agreement coming up in August it is I think an appropriate time to look back at the Settlement Plan. I will quote liberally from the International Crisis Group’s (ICG) June 2007 report, Western Sahara: Out of the Impasse, which gives a concise, accurate, and well-written analysis of the referendum years (all quotes below are from that report with page numbers noted).

    In August 1988, both Polisario and Morocco declared that they accepted a UN proposal (based on an earlier OAU proposal) for a ceasefire, exchange of prisoners, repatriation of refugees and the withdrawal of Moroccan forces from the territory, to be followed by a referendum on self-determination, with the choice being between independence and integration into Morocco. A final version of this proposal, known as the Settlement Plan, was approved by the Security Council in 1991. (p.1-2)

    I was following the issue at the UN in Geneva in the early 1990’s and remember the euphoria accompanying the Settlement Plan. The Polisario and Hassan II had met for the first time; a mutually-acceptable plan to resolve the crisis had become a reality; MINURSO was in place to register voters; and the referendum was expected within a year. The euphoria, however, proved to be short lived. With the ink on the Settlement Plan still wet, Morocco embarked on a pattern of obstruction that would eventually result in the scuttling of the Plan a decade later. The ICG continues:

    Morocco and the Polisario Front had formally agreed in 1988 that the referendum should be based on the electorate as defined by the 1974 census of the territory….But in April 1991 King Hassan of Morocco insisted that the voter rolls be expanded well beyond what has previously been agreed and include people who had long been settled in Morocco. (p. 2)

    Had King Hassan allowed MINURSO to do its work per the Settlement Agreement, the referendum would have taken place in 1992 or 1993 and the crisis would have been over. Instead he chose to pursue a strategy of trying to pad the electoral roles with pro-Rabat Moroccans “in order to maximize Morocco’s chances of winning the referendum.” (p. 2) The Polisario of course resisted this attempt to rewrite and circumvent the agreement, and by mid-decade the referendum process had made little progress. Then along came James Baker III to try to save the day.

    When the process seemed in danger of coming to a stop, the personal envoy of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the former U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker III, managed to rescue it through intensive diplomacy. In a series of meetings which he held with Morocco, Polisario and Algeria in April 1997, all three parties reaffirmed their commitment to the 1991 Settlement Plan. Further rounds in London and Lisbon paved the way for a final meeting in Houston on 14-16 September 1997. There, agreement was reached by the parties on all the issues blocking implementation of the Settlement Plan, including the key issue of voter identification. (p. 2)

    With a new agreement in hand, MINURSO was able to resume the registration of voters. “In January 2000, MINURSO, after years of meticulous work, at last arrived at what it regarded as a fair determination of the valid electorate for the proposed referendum, namely a total electorate of 86,386.” (p. 2) At that point, once again the end of the crisis was in sight and the referendum could have been held in short order. But Rabat had other ideas. MINURSO was “promptly faced with no fewer than 131,038 appeals against its decisions…, the vast majority of these Moroccan-sponsored applicants.” (p. 2) The Settlement Plan was dead.

    Reluctant to dismiss these appeals and accordingly faced with the prospect of, in effect, having to begin the voter identification process all over again, the UN tacitly dropped the 1991 Settlement Plan…. (p. 2)

    Again, my reason for returning to this history of the Settlement Plan is to counter the view of the pro-Rabat people that autonomy is a fine compromise justified by the elusiveness of a “mutually-acceptable solution.” As you should see from the above, the parties mutually accepted two major solutions in 1988 and 1997, and Morocco obstructed, undermined, and ultimately trashed both. Again, the ICG is eloquent on this:

    There is a clear asymmetry in the behaviour of the main parties. The Polisario Front signed up to the 1991 Settlement Plan and, having made a number of concessions on the voter identification issue and on certain secondary matters, was clearly prepared to abide by its outcome…. It cannot be said of Polisario that it went back on any of its undertakings. But Morocco repeatedly did so with impunity. Whenever matters came to a head, Morocco demonstrated that it did not accept UN arbitration ofimportant issues if this arbitration went – or threatened to go – against it. AndMorocco also, and above all, repeatedly demonstrated that it accepted the principle of self-determination only if the result of its exercise in a referendum could be guaranteed in advance to be in Morocco’s favour. (p. 5)

    Why was the autonomy initiative devised? Tanya Warburg’s view that it has to do withMorocco’s desire to find a “mutually-acceptable solution” to break the deadlock is pure nonsense. Once again, such a solution was reached years ago and Morocco showed itself to be a thoroughly dishonest and duplicitous negotiating partner. The autonomy initiative is nothing more than a cynical attempt by Morocco to leverage its friendship with the U.S. and France to prevent self-determination in the ex-colony and to gain formal recognition of its illegal annexation. I say “cynical” because history has proven that Morocco and its apologists such as Tanya Warburg couldn’t care less about the well-being of the Western Saharans. If they did they wouldn’t be so insistent on denying them the right to vote on their future.

  • Tout pour le Sahara

    Dix-huit ans se sont écoulés depuis l’enclenchement du plan de paix onusien pour le Sahara Occidental. Une période beaucoup trop longue pour un simple problème de décolonisation qui a créé tant de tension et empêche la mise en marche d’un véritable programme de coopération et de développement dont les peuples ont besoin. La seule raison de ce blocage est que le Maroc n’est pas près d’accepter une solution qui ne vise pas à entériner l’assimilation pure et simple de ce pays.

    Le Matin du Sahara et du Maghreb, le journal du palais, nous rappelle dans son édition du 27 juillet 2009 que Christopher Ross, l’envoyé spécial des NN.UU « sait que la question du Sahara n’a jamais cessé de constituer une revendication majeure du peuple marocain. Elle n’a jamais été une question de circonstance ou même de règne, mais elle incarne la traduction populaire. Posée déjà sur le bureau des Nations unies depuis l’indépendance du Maroc en 1956, elle constitue l’affaire centrale du gouvernement marocain. »

    En effet, depuis le début, la question était un domaine réservé du Palais dont le but principal est de combattre toute influence de l’Algérie dans la région et non pas trouver une issue qui conviendrait à toutes les parties. Pour consolider sa position sur le niveau interne, le gouvernement a fait du Sahara un drame national, voire existentiel au royaume, a imposé une certaine unanimité sous le slogan de « l’intégrité territoriale » et alimenté la haine envers l’Algérie en la traitant de principal responsable de ses malheurs.

    Dans ce contexte, Le Matin ajoute que « maintenant que l’ONU reprend son rôle, qu’elle a initié une approche consensuelle, politique et définitive, l’Algérie s’emploie cyniquement à nous ramener à la case de départ ». Ce discours n’est pas nouveau puisque le Maroc a toujours cherché à trouver un arrangement avec l’Algérie sans consulter les sahraouis. Pour le Maroc, c’est le gouvernement algérien qui « tire les ficelles dans cette affaire ». La nature rancunière des dirigeants marocains ne laisse aucune place à l’éventualité d’un Etat sahraoui indépendant. Le Maroc a bien voulu partager le territoire avec la Mauritanie en vertu des Accords Tripartites de Madrid. Par contre, il a refusé d’octroyer cette partie du Sahara Occidental (Rio de Oro) aux sahraouis. Pourtant, cette proposition a bien été lancée dans les années 1990. Pourquoi? Il n’est pas question pour les dirigeants marocains d’accepter l’existence d’un Etat avec de bonnes relations avec l’Algérie. La haine conduit leur pensée et leurs actes.

    C’est cette haine qui a poussé le Maroc à tout jouer pour le Sahara. En 1977, les services secrets marocains ont fait exploser la voiture de l’ambassadeur mauritanien en France pour pousser le gouvernement français à expulser les activistes du Front Polisario en France qui, à l’époque, était un véritable foyer de solidarité avec le peuple sahraoui. Pour le Sahara, la DST marocaine a aidé les terroristes à traverser les frontières algéro-marocaines pendant la décennie de terreur vécue par le peuple algérien dans les années 1990. Pour le Sahara, le gouvernement marocain a accepté d’importer la torture des membres présumés d’Al Qaïda en collaboration avec la CIA et le MI-5. Pour le Sahara, le Maroc était prêt à héberger le commandement des forces américaines, l’AFRICOM. Pour le Sahara, Mohamed VI a pris la décision de rompre les relations avec l’Iran et le Vénezuela pour attirer la sympathie de l’administration américaine et du lobby juif tout puissant aux Etats-Unis. Qu’est-ce qui ne ferait pas le Maroc pour se venger de l’Algérie?

    Hassan II avait accepté le plan de paix, en 1991, parce qu’il avait perdu la guerre mais il voulait la gagner autrement. Avec le soutien de la France, qui prône le soutien aux thèses annexionnistes marocaines comme un moyen de pression contre l’Algérie dans le dossier de la repentance. Sinon, comment expliquer un engagement français aussi grossier au sein du Conseil de Sécurité jusqu’au point de s’opposer au contrôle des droits de l’homme au Sahara Occidental?

    Dix-huit ans après le cessez-le-feu, le Maroc cherche toujours à gagner la bataille du Sahara Occidental par les manœuvres dilatoires, les mensonges, les manipulations et le défi à la communauté internationale.

    Il serait très naïf de croire à la bonne volonté des autorités de Rabat. Leur intention est de continuer à faire semblant de négocier, de chercher une solution, tout faire pour que le processus dure encore des années.

    Ils ont parié sur feu président Boudiaf, mais le destin a changé le cours des évènements. Ils ont patienté dans l’espoir de voir le président Bouteflika s’éloigner d’El Mouradia, mais son troisième mandat a failli provoquer une crise cardiaque à Rabat. Devant cette déception, Mohamed VI fait son possible pour maintenir le statu quo dans l’espoir que le changement vienne du gouvernement algérien. De là l’insistance du régime marocain sur la réouverture des frontières. Pour le Maroc, ce serait un retour à la normalité avec l’Algérie, tout en laissant le statu quo, qui veut dire que les réfugiés sahraouis restent éternellement en Algérie, continuer à s’engouffrer du pillage des ressources naturelles sahraouies, davantage de répression et de violation des droits de l’homme dans les territoires occupés du Sahara Occidental. Une façon de concrétiser le discours marocain dirigé aux sahraouis : « Le Maroc se trouve dans son Sahara et le Sahara se trouve dans son Maroc, et vous, vous pouvez crever dans le désert algérien ».

  • Tout pour le Sahara

    Dix-huit ans se sont écoulés depuis l’enclenchement du plan de paix onusien pour le Sahara Occidental. Une période beaucoup trop longue pour un simple problème de décolonisation qui a créé tant de tension et empêche la mise en marche d’un véritable programme de coopération et de développement dont les peuples ont besoin. La seule raison de ce blocage est que le Maroc n’est pas près d’accepter une solution qui ne vise pas à entériner l’assimilation pure et simple de ce pays.

    Le Matin du Sahara et du Maghreb, le journal du palais, nous rappelle dans son édition du 27 juillet 2009 que Christopher Ross, l’envoyé spécial des NN.UU « sait que la question du Sahara n’a jamais cessé de constituer une revendication majeure du peuple marocain. Elle n’a jamais été une question de circonstance ou même de règne, mais elle incarne la traduction populaire. Posée déjà sur le bureau des Nations unies depuis l’indépendance du Maroc en 1956, elle constitue l’affaire centrale du gouvernement marocain. »

    En effet, depuis le début, la question était un domaine réservé du Palais dont le but principal est de combattre toute influence de l’Algérie dans la région et non pas trouver une issue qui conviendrait à toutes les parties. Pour consolider sa position sur le niveau interne, le gouvernement a fait du Sahara un drame national, voire existentiel au royaume, a imposé une certaine unanimité sous le slogan de « l’intégrité territoriale » et alimenté la haine envers l’Algérie en la traitant de principal responsable de ses malheurs.

    Dans ce contexte, Le Matin ajoute que « maintenant que l’ONU reprend son rôle, qu’elle a initié une approche consensuelle, politique et définitive, l’Algérie s’emploie cyniquement à nous ramener à la case de départ ». Ce discours n’est pas nouveau puisque le Maroc a toujours cherché à trouver un arrangement avec l’Algérie sans consulter les sahraouis. Pour le Maroc, c’est le gouvernement algérien qui « tire les ficelles dans cette affaire ». La nature rancunière des dirigeants marocains ne laisse aucune place à l’éventualité d’un Etat sahraoui indépendant. Le Maroc a bien voulu partager le territoire avec la Mauritanie en vertu des Accords Tripartites de Madrid. Par contre, il a refusé d’octroyer cette partie du Sahara Occidental (Rio de Oro) aux sahraouis. Pourtant, cette proposition a bien été lancée dans les années 1990. Pourquoi? Il n’est pas question pour les dirigeants marocains d’accepter l’existence d’un Etat avec de bonnes relations avec l’Algérie. La haine conduit leur pensée et leurs actes.

    C’est cette haine qui a poussé le Maroc à tout jouer pour le Sahara. En 1977, les services secrets marocains ont fait exploser la voiture de l’ambassadeur mauritanien en France pour pousser le gouvernement français à expulser les activistes du Front Polisario en France qui, à l’époque, était un véritable foyer de solidarité avec le peuple sahraoui. Pour le Sahara, la DST marocaine a aidé les terroristes à traverser les frontières algéro-marocaines pendant la décennie de terreur vécue par le peuple algérien dans les années 1990. Pour le Sahara, le gouvernement marocain a accepté d’importer la torture des membres présumés d’Al Qaïda en collaboration avec la CIA et le MI-5. Pour le Sahara, le Maroc était prêt à héberger le commandement des forces américaines, l’AFRICOM. Pour le Sahara, Mohamed VI a pris la décision de rompre les relations avec l’Iran et le Vénezuela pour attirer la sympathie de l’administration américaine et du lobby juif tout puissant aux Etats-Unis. Qu’est-ce qui ne ferait pas le Maroc pour se venger de l’Algérie?

    Hassan II avait accepté le plan de paix, en 1991, parce qu’il avait perdu la guerre mais il voulait la gagner autrement. Avec le soutien de la France, qui prône le soutien aux thèses annexionnistes marocaines comme un moyen de pression contre l’Algérie dans le dossier de la repentance. Sinon, comment expliquer un engagement français aussi grossier au sein du Conseil de Sécurité jusqu’au point de s’opposer au contrôle des droits de l’homme au Sahara Occidental?

    Dix-huit ans après le cessez-le-feu, le Maroc cherche toujours à gagner la bataille du Sahara Occidental par les manœuvres dilatoires, les mensonges, les manipulations et le défi à la communauté internationale.

    Il serait très naïf de croire à la bonne volonté des autorités de Rabat. Leur intention est de continuer à faire semblant de négocier, de chercher une solution, tout faire pour que le processus dure encore des années.

    Ils ont parié sur feu président Boudiaf, mais le destin a changé le cours des évènements. Ils ont patienté dans l’espoir de voir le président Bouteflika s’éloigner d’El Mouradia, mais son troisième mandat a failli provoquer une crise cardiaque à Rabat. Devant cette déception, Mohamed VI fait son possible pour maintenir le statu quo dans l’espoir que le changement vienne du gouvernement algérien. De là l’insistance du régime marocain sur la réouverture des frontières. Pour le Maroc, ce serait un retour à la normalité avec l’Algérie, tout en laissant le statu quo, qui veut dire que les réfugiés sahraouis restent éternellement en Algérie, continuer à s’engouffrer du pillage des ressources naturelles sahraouies, davantage de répression et de violation des droits de l’homme dans les territoires occupés du Sahara Occidental. Une façon de concrétiser le discours marocain dirigé aux sahraouis : « Le Maroc se trouve dans son Sahara et le Sahara se trouve dans son Maroc, et vous, vous pouvez crever dans le désert algérien ».